Preface ........................................................ xi
Introduction: Objective Rules of Thought ........................ 1
§1 Philosophical anti-exceptionalism ....................... 3
§2 Pure rational thinking .................................. 5
§3 Philosophical traditionalism ............................ 7
§4 Experiential rationalism ................................ 9
§5 The intersubjective validity and objectivity of rational
inquiry ................................................ 10
Part I: Propositions, Fregean Sense, and Rational Modality
1 A Fregean Theory of Propositional Attitudes ................. 15
§1.1 Propositions as structures of concepts ................ 15
§1.2 Concepts .............................................. 17
§1.3 Use and representational content ...................... 19
§1.4 The language of thought ............................... 21
§1.5 Conclusive rational relations ......................... 22
§1.6 Trouble from the Preface Paradox? ..................... 23
§1.7 Proof and refutation .................................. 24
§1.8 Fregean senses ........................................ 26
§1.9 An alternative theory of Fregean senses ............... 29
§1.10 Distinguishing senses of "rational commitment" ........ 32
§1.11 Realizing propositional attitudes ..................... 35
§1.12 Rules and rationality ................................. 39
§1.13 Conclusive rationality and defeasibility .............. 42
2 A Theory of Rational Modality ............................... 47
§2.1 Rational entailment ................................... 47
§2.2 Rational possibility and other family notions ......... 50
§2.3 Rational and metaphysical entailment .................. 52
§2.4 Coherence and rational modality ....................... 53
§2.5 Rationally possible scenarios and truth conditions .... 54
§2.6 Rational entailment and revision ...................... 55
§2.7 R-Possibility,"epistemic possibility," and neo-
Russellianism ......................................... 58
§2.8 The rationality version of Frege's puzzle ............. 61
§2.9 R-Possibility and Frege's puzzle ...................... 65
§2.10 Kripke's "A Puzzle about Belief" and Frege's puzzle ... 67
§2.11 David Chalmers's "epistemic possibilities" ............ 68
§2.12 Against two-dimensionalism ............................ 69
3 The Psychological Realization of Fregean Sense .............. 75
§3.1 Ontology .............................................. 75
§3.2 Quinean revisability .................................. 75
§3.3 Harman on Bonjour ..................................... 77
§3.4 "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" ............................ 79
§3.5 The psychological reality of rational entailment ...... 81
§3.6 Our theory of psychological reality contrasted:
Peacocke .............................................. 86
§3.7 Our theory of psychological reality contrasted:
Davidson .............................................. 87
§3.8 Our theory of the psychological reality of rational
entailment recapitulated .............................. 89
§3.9 General second-order inferential competencies ......... 90
§3.10 Theory-building ....................................... 93
§3.11 Indeterminate rational relations ...................... 95
§3.12 Kripke and proper names ............................... 97
§3.13 Indeterminate singular concepts ...................... 100
§3.14 Fregean sense, descriptivism, and conceptual role .... 102
§3.15 Non-intentional rule-following ....................... 105
4 The Sociability of a Fregean Theory ........................ 108
§4.1 Social anti-individualism ............................ 109
§4.2 Analyticity and social anti-individualism ............ 110
§4.3 The publicity of propositions and concepts ........... 111
§4.4 Social Fregeanism .................................... 113
§4.5 Deferential and non-deferential concept possession ... 115
§4.6 Proper names again ................................... 117
§4.7 Timothy Williamson on conceptual truths .............. 118
§4.8 Conceptual refinement ................................ 120
§4.9 Socially externalizing rationality ................... 121
§4.10 Propositional attitude ascriptions and testimony ..... 125
§4.11 A naive neo-Russellian theory of propositional
attitude ascriptions ................................. 128
5 Fregean Sense First ........................................ 132
§5.1 The minimalist explanation ........................... 133
§5.2 Inherent and essential rational relations ............ 134
§5.3 Reductive strategies ................................. 136
§5.4 Reduction, factorization, and analysis ............... 137
§5.5 Boghossian and concept possession .................... 139
§5.6 Peacocke and metasemantics ........................... 143
§5.7 Wright, Enoch and Schechter, and pragmatism .......... 147
§5.8 Field and evaluativism ............................... 154
Part II: Rationality, Apriority, and Philosophy
6 A Theory of the A Priori ................................... 161
§6.1 Apriority and propositional justification ............ 162
§6.2 An alternative approach: Albert Casullo .............. 164
§6.3 A priori transitions in thought ...................... 165
§6.4 Experience in a warranting role ...................... 166
§6.5 Experience and d-justification ....................... 169
§6.6 Apriority and r-necessity ............................ 170
§6.7 Apriority and empirical indefeasibility .............. 171
§6.8 Is apriority homogeneous? ............................ 174
§6.9 Is our theory of the a priori vacuous? ............... 176
§6.10 The nature of experience ............................. 177
7 A Priori Philosophy: Responses to Objections ............... 179
§7.1 A posteriori knowledge of a priori faculties ......... 179
§7.2 Limiting the challenge: Non-basic methods? ........... 181
§7.3 Knowledge and knowledge of knowledge ................. 184
§7.4 A priori reliability of a priori methods ............. 186
§7.5 Philosophy and knowledge of philosophical abilities .. 187
§7.6 Thought-experiments and the quotidian ................ 188
§7.7 Perceptual faculties in imagination .................. 189
§7.8 Peeking as self-experimentation? ..................... 191
§7.9 Misleading "a priori" feelings ....................... 194
8 The Content of Thought-Experiment Judgments ................ 198
§8.1 Formalizing thought-experiment arguments:
Necessity? ........................................... 199
§8.2 Timothy Williamson's counterfactual formulation ...... 201
§8.3 Against the counterfactual formulation ............... 202
§8.4 Attempted patches .................................... 203
§8.5 Thought-experiments as fictions ...................... 204
§8.6 Fictions fixing content .............................. 206
§8.7 Disanalogies between thought-experiments and
fictions? ............................................ 209
§8.8 Reasoning and thought-experiments .................... 212
§8.9 Other argumentative roles for thought-experiments .... 213
§8.10 Non-argumentative roles for thought-experiments ...... 214
9 The Epistemology of Thought-Experiment Judgments ........... 216
§9.1 Content and inferential competencies ................. 217
§9.2 Reliability and knowledge about imaginary scenarios .. 218
§9.3 Two points ........................................... 221
§9.4 Knowledge of necessity ............................... 224
§9.5 Categorization and apriority ......................... 225
§9.6 On conceptual analysis ............................... 226
10 Rational Imagination and Modal Epistemology ................ 231
§10.1 Imagination as supposition ........................... 232
§10.2 Imagination and possibility .......................... 234
§10.3 Coherent imagination ................................. 235
§10.4 Rational imagination ................................. 236
§10.5 Defeasible inference in imagination .................. 239
§10.6 R-modality and metaphysical modality ................. 240
§10.7 The coherent impossible .............................. 242
§10.8 From rational to metaphysical possibility ............ 243
§10.9 Moral theorems ....................................... 246
§10.10 Mathematical truths ................................. 247
§10.11 A priori knowledge of rational modality ............. 248
§10.12 Overstipulation ..................................... 250
Appendix A: The misidentification response ................. 252
Appendix B: Natural kinds .................................. 255
Part III: Intuitions and Philosophy
11 The Nature of Intuitions ................................... 261
§11.1 Eliminativism ....................................... 262
§11.2 Reductionism ........................................ 263
§11.3 The robust picture of intuitions .................... 264
§11.4 Williamson on phenomenology ......................... 265
§11.5 Earlenbaugh and Molyneux ............................ 267
§11.6 Reductionism without insignificance ................. 271
12 Against Strong Experiential Rationalism .................... 274
§12.1 Strong experiential rationalism ..................... 275
§12.2 Intuitions and evidence ............................. 277
§12.3 Evidence concerning the psychological ............... 279
§12.4 Blind irrationality ................................. 281
§12.5 What you can't see, can't rationally constrain
you? ................................................ 282
§12.6 The intersubjective validity of rational norms ...... 284
§12.7 The objectivity of rational norms ................... 285
§12.8 Reliabilist strong experiential rationalism ......... 288
§12.9 Against phenomenal conservatism ..................... 290
§12.10 Against general foundationalism ..................... 294
§12.11 Against subjective foundationalism .................. 295
§12.12 Intuitions and evidence revisited ................... 297
§12.13 Intuitions and purely rational inquiry .............. 299
13 Intuition as a Source of Evidence? ......................... 301
§13.1 A simple argument .................................... 301
§13.2 Blind irrationality reconsidered ..................... 303
§13.3 Epistemology and psychology .......................... 304
§13.4 Apriority and the "New Evil Demon" problem ........... 307
§13.5 Perceptual justification and the Problem of the
Speckled Hen ......................................... 309
§13.6 Failure of justified belief .......................... 312
§13.7 Intuiting and perceiving compared .................... 314
§13.8 Intuiting and perceiving contrasted .................. 315
§13.9 The Benacerraf-Field challenge ....................... 317
14 Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Methodology ...... 319
§14.1 Positive experimental philosophy ..................... 319
§14.2 Negative experimental philosophy ..................... 322
§14.3 The use of intuitions in philosophy .................. 324
§14.4 The critique generalized? ............................ 325
§14.5 Epistemology and methodology ......................... 329
§14.6 Traditional methodology and experimental philosophy .. 330
§14.7 Philosophy and the quotidian ......................... 332
References .................................................... 335
Index ......................................................... 351
|
