Series Editors' Preface ....................................... iii
Preface and Acknowledgements .................................. xiv
Introduction .................................................... 1
I Epistemic Warrant: A First Approximation ................ 11
I.I General features of epistemic warrant ................... 12
I.I.a The truth-connection ........................... 12
I.I.b The epistemic luck condition ................... 13
I.I.c The competence condition ....................... 16
I.I.d Doxastic and propositional warrant ............. 18
I.I.e Competence-oriented vs. deontological
epistemology ................................... 20
I.I.f Internalism and externalism .................... 23
I.I.g General features of warrant: concluding
remarks ........................................ 24
I.II Warrant and knowledge ................................... 24
I.II.a Warrant, knowledge and epistemological
methodology .................................... 24
I.II.b Inferential Gettier case ....................... 26
I.II.c Perceptual Gettier-style case .................. 26
I.II.d The Gettier-style cases in perspective ......... 27
I.II.e The Gettier-style case vs. the knowledge
cases .......................................... 29
I.II.f Hallmarks of Gettier-style cases ............... 32
I.II.h Concluding remarks on warrant and knowledge .... 33
I.III Normal circumstances vs. relevant alternatives .......... 33
I.III.a Relevant alternatives vs. normal
circumstances .................................. 34
I.III.b Basic similarities ............................. 36
I.III.c On normal circumstances ........................ 37
I.IV Epistemic warrant: concluding remarks ................... 40
II Warrant, Reasoning and Competence ....................... 42
II.I A few restrictions ...................................... 43
II.I.a Restriction to warrant by purportedly
deductive epistemic reasoning ................. 43
II.I.b Restriction to empirical epistemic
reasoning ...................................... 45
II.I.c Restriction to non-skeptical investigation ..... 45
II.I.d A note on terminology .......................... 46
II.II Reasoning as a source of warrant ........................ 46
II.II.a The truth-conduciveness of reasoning ........... 46
II.II.b Reasoning as a non-basic source of warrant ..... 48
II.III Warrant and reasoning: the traditonal conception ........ 50
II.III.a The empirical robustness of purportedly
deductive reasoning ..................................... 50
II.III.b Towards an articulation of the traditional
conception ..................................... 52
II.IV The classical biconditional ............................. 56
II.IV.a Motivation of (Validity Requirement) ........... 57
II.IV.b An alleged objection to (Validity
Requirement) ................................... 60
II.IV.c The classical biconditional in conclusion ...... 61
II.V Epistemic reasoning and competence ...................... 61
II.V.a Reasoning and competence ....................... 62
II.VI The conformity problem .................................. 64
II.VI.a Articulating the conformity problem ............ 64
II.VI.b The nature of the conformity problem ........... 66
II.VI.c Concluding remarks on the сonformity problem ... 68
II.VII The univocality-competence ............................. 69
II.VII.a Competence and concept possession .............. 70
II.VII.b The univocality-competence and the notion
of univocality ................................. 71
II.VII.с Univocality and type-identity .................. 73
II.VII.d Univocality and co-reference ................... 74
Il.VII.e Varieties of univocal thinking ................. 77
II.VIII The fallibility of the univocality-competence .......... 78
II.VIII.a Varieties of univocality-competence failure ... 78
II.VIII.b Cases of univocality success and failure ...... 85
II.VIII.c Concept triad ................................. 85
II.VIII.d Demonstrative triad ........................... 88
II.VIII.e Name triad .................................... 91
II.VIII.f Conceptual equivocation vs. referential
mistake ........................................ 94
II.VIII.g Concluding remarks on the fallibility of
the univocality-competence ..................... 97
II.IX Characterizing the univocality-competence ............... 97
II.IX.a Against attitudinal accounts ................... 98
II.IX.b Against higher-order attitudinal accounts ...... 98
II.IX.c Against symmetric first-order attitudinal
accounts ...................................... 100
II.IX.d Against asymmetric first-order attitudinal
accounts ...................................... 104
II.X Inferential presuppositions ............................ 108
II.X.a Inferential presuppositions ................... 109
II.X.b Inferential presuppositions and normative
commitments ................................... 110
II.X.c The form and content of inferential
presuppositions ............................... 112
II.X.d Presuppositions vs. attitudes ................. 116
II.X.e Concluding remarks on inferential
presuppositions ............................... 118
II.XI The epistemic significance of univocality .............. 120
II.XI.a The warrant for inferential presuppositions ... 121
II.XI.b The epistemological significance of
inferential presuppositions ............................ 123
II.XII Concluding remarks ..................................... 124
III Anti-Individualism and Twin Earth ...................... 126
III.I Anti-individualism in philosophy of mind ............... 126
III.I.a Characterizing the individualism/
anti-individualism dispute .................... 127
III.I.b Restriction to propositional attitudes ........ 131
III.II Twin Earth ............................................. 133
III.II.a The Twin Earth scenario ....................... 133
III.II.b Twin Earth arguments .......................... 134
III.II.c Variations of the Twin Earth arguments ........ 137
III.III Twin Earth: methodological considerations ............. 140
III.III.a Dialectical considerations ................... 140
III.III.b The possibility of Twin Earth ................ 142
III.III.c The twins' thoughts .......................... 144
III.III.d An individualist objection ................... 145
III.III.e Concluding methodological remarks ............ 147
III.IV Towards principles of attitude individuation ........... 147
III.IV.a Twin Earth and the principles of attitude-
individuation ................................. 148
III.IV.b The normal environment ........................ 151
III.V In conclusion: anti-individualism and rationality ...... 154
IV Slow-Switch Cases and the Individualist Challenge ...... 156
IV.I The slow switch cases .................................. 156
IV.I.a Introducing the slow-switch cases ............. 157
IV.I.b Reasoning after a conceptual switch ........... 159
IV.II The equivocation interpretation ........................ 160
IV.II.a Boghossian's interpretation ................... 161
IV.II.b Compartmentalization of the mind .............. 163
IV.II.c Explanation of the fallibility of the
univocality-competence ........................ 164
IV.II.d What's anti-individualism got to do with it? .. 166
IV.II.e Concluding remarks on the basis of the
equivocation account .......................... 167
IV.III Alternative accounts of the slow-switch case ........... 168
IV.III.a The no-switch interpretation .................. 168
IV.III.b The deep-switch interpretation ................ 172
IV.III.c The anaphoric memory interpretation ........... 177
IV.III.d The amalgam interpretation .................... 183
IV.IV The proviso of epistemic abnormality ................... 191
IV.IV.a The proviso of epistemic abnormality .......... 191
IV.IV.b A challenge to the proviso .................... 192
IV.IV.c In defense of the proviso of epistemic
abnormality ................................... 195
IV.V The slow-switch case in perspective .................... 200
IV.V.a Specification required ........................ 200
IV.V.b Methodological liberalism ..................... 201
IV.V.c Anti-individualism and the equivocation
interpritation ................................ 201
IV.VI The slow-switch case and the individualist arguments ... 204
IV.VI.a (Validity Failure) and (Valid 1) .............. 205
IV.VI.b (Transparency) and (Trans 1) .................. 207
IV.VII The argument from Transparency Failure ................. 209
IV.VII.a The argument from Transparency Failure ........ 209
IV.VII.b Motivation of the premises (Trans 0)-
(Trans 3) ..................................... 209
IV.VII.c An anti-individualist critique of (Trans 3) ... 212
IV.VII.d The argument from Transparency Failure
concluded ..................................... 217
IV.VIII The Validity Argument ................................. 218
IV.VIII.a The Validity Argument ........................ 218
IV.VIII.b The relation between the two individualist
arguments .................................... 219
IV.VIII.c Motivation of (Valid 0)-(Valid 3) ............ 222
IV.IX Concluding remarks on the individualist challenge ...... 226
V An Anti-Individualist Response ......................... 228
V.I Lay of the land ........................................ 229
V.I.a Responses to the Validity Argument ............. 229
V.II Critique of (Valid 3) .................................. 231
V.II.a Preliminary critique of (Valid 3) ............. 232
V.II.b Individualist responses to the preliminary
critique of (Valid 3) ......................... 234
V.II.c The status of (Valid 3) and (Validity
Requirement) .................................. 236
V.III Presupposition failure: a comparative interlude ........ 237
V.III.a Presupposition failure and the slow-switch
case .......................................... 238
V.III.b Campbell ...................................... 238
V.III.c Brown ......................................... 241
V.III.d Burge (and Burge vs. Campbell) ................ 244
V.III.e Campbell again ................................ 249
V.III.f Concluding remarks on the comparative
interlude ..................................... 251
V.IV Towards a false presupposition account ................. 251
V.IV.a Peter's inferential presuppositions ........... 252
V.IV.b The epistemic significance of Peter's
inferential presuppositions ................... 253
V.V Slow-switches and epistemic rationality ................ 255
V.V.a Warranted false inferential presuppositions ... 256
V.V.b Reasoning and warranted false inferential
presuppositions ............................... 258
V.V.c Defense of (Valid 2) from the above
conclusions ................................... 262
V.VI Direct defenses of (Valid 2) ........................... 264
V.VI.a Reasoning competencies and validity-
conduciveness ................................. 265
V.VI.b Enter Pedro ................................... 268
V.VI.c Enter Gettier ................................. 270
V.VI.d An underlying similarity ...................... 273
V.VI.e Concluding remarks on (Valid 2) ............... 276
V.VII Objections to the account .............................. 277
V.VII.a The charge of deontologism .................... 277
V.VII.b Response to the charge of deontologism ........ 278
V.VII.c An anti-individualist objection to (Valid 2) .. 281
V.VII.d Answering the anti-individualist challenge .... 286
V.VIII Concluding remarks ..................................... 287
VI Towards Principles of Epistemic Reasoning .............. 290
VI.I The role of validity in epistemic reasoning ............ 291
VI.I.a Validity vs. legitimacy ....................... 291
VI.II Safe belief vs. safe competence ........................ 292
VI.II.a Traditional conceptions of safety and
their problems ................................ 292
VI.II.b Towards a revised safety principle ............ 296
VI.II.c Reasoning competencies, again ................. 297
VI.III Safety and legitimacy .................................. 304
VI.III.a Epistemic legitimacy .......................... 304
VI.IV Epistemically normal circumstances ..................... 308
VI.IV.a Normal circumstances vs. relevant
alternatives .................................. 308
VI.IV.b What circumstances are epistemically
abnormal? ..................................... 310
VI.IV.c Epistemic normality and the normal
environment ................................... 311
VI.IV.d General epistemic normality vs. p-relevant
epistemic normality ........................... 313
VI.IV.e General epistemic normality and the normal
environment ................................... 316
VI.IV.f Epistemically normal circumstances
in perspective ................................ 320
VI.V Concluding remarks ..................................... 321
References .................................................... 324
Index ......................................................... 333
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