 | Fumerton R. Knowledge, thought, and the case for dualism. - Cambridge; New York: Cambridge univ. press, 2013. - xv, 283 p. - (Cambridge studies in philosophy). - Incl. bibl. ref. and ind. - ISBN 978-1-107-03787-8
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Preface ...................................................... xiii
1 Setting the stage ............................................ 1
1.1 Leibniz's law and the Cartesian argument for dualism .... 6
1.2 Hard vs. easy problems of consciousness ................ 21
1.3 Summary ................................................ 27
2 Distinctions: versions of physicalism and dualism ........... 29
2.1 Substance physicalism/dualism .......................... 29
2.2 Property physicalism/dualism ........................... 36
2.3 Fact physicalism/dualism ............................... 39
2.4 Event physicalism/dualism .............................. 41
2.5 Proposition physicalism/dualism ........................ 42
2.6 Sentence physicalism/dualism ........................... 44
2.7 Defining "mental" and "physical" ....................... 45
2.8 Physical sciences and physical properties .............. 46
2.9 Epistemological characterizations of the mental/
physical ............................................... 49
2.10 Intentionality as the mark of the mental ............... 52
2.11 Giving up .............................................. 58
2.12 Varieties of physicalism ............................... 60
2.13 Logical behaviorism .................................... 64
2.14 The mind/brain identity theory ......................... 72
2.15 Functionalism .......................................... 76
3 Ontological priorities: taking phenomenology seriously ...... 91
3.1 Foundationalism ........................................ 92
3.2 Regress arguments for foundationalism .................. 93
3.3 Epistemic regress ...................................... 94
3.4 The conceptual regress argument ........................ 96
3.5 Acquaintance ........................................... 98
3.6 Inferential justification and the physical world ...... 119
3.7 Internalism and the threat of skepticism .............. 130
3.8 Rejecting methodological naturalism ................... 132
3.9 Is there any contribution science can make to the
philosophy of mind? ................................... 143
3.10 Summary ............................................... 149
4 Knowledge arguments revisited .............................. 150
4.1 The ability hypothesis ................................ 157
4.2 Getting acquainted with color experience .............. 161
4.3 Mary's new beliefs .................................... 165
4.4 Different propositions; same truth-maker .............. 169
4.5 Summary ............................................... 181
5 Indirect thought and informative identity .................. 182
5.1 The direct reference theory ........................... 183
5.2 Two traditional accounts of foundational thought ...... 189
5.3 Objections to sense theories .......................... 192
5.4 Anti-descriptivist alternatives ....................... 195
5.5 Did Mary always have beliefs about phenomenal color? .. 201
5.6 Informative identity .................................. 206
6 An ontologically liberating skepticism: the last hope
for physicalism ............................................ 208
6.1 Indirect understanding of the physical ................ 210
6.2 An ontologically liberating skepticism ................ 218
6.3 Panpsychism ........................................... 225
6.4 Is this a version of physicalism? ..................... 227
6.5 Summary ............................................... 231
7 Objections and replies ..................................... 233
7.1 Jackson's rejection of the knowledge argument ......... 233
7.2 Foundationalism of knowledge and thought .............. 239
7.3 The causal theory of objects .......................... 245
7.4 Causal overdetermination .............................. 246
8 The ubiquitous self: a brief postscript .................... 257
8.1 Summary ............................................... 257
8.2 Substance dualism in the background? .................. 258
8.3 The self and the body ................................. 258
8.4 Humean rejection of the self .......................... 259
8.5 Reduce where you can: commit where you can't .......... 264
8.6 Diachronic identity ................................... 267
References .................................................... 271
Index ......................................................... 279
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