Preface ....................................................... xii
Acknowledgements ............................................... xv
List offigures ............................................... xvii
List of tables ................................................ xix
Ust of most common acronyms .................................... xx
Chapter 1 What is the philosophy of information? ............... 1
Summary ......................................................... 1
1.1 Introduction ............................................... 1
1.2 Philosophy of artificial intelligence as a premature
paradigm of PI ............................................. 2
1.3 The historical emergence of PI ............................. 5
1.4 The dialectic of reflection and the emergence of PI ........ 7
1.5 The definition of PI ...................................... 13
1.6 The analytic approach to PI ............................... 17
1.7 The metaphysical approach to PI ........................... 19
1.8 PI as philosophie prima ................................... 24
Conclusion ..................................................... 25
Chapter 2 Open problems in the philosophy of information ...... 26
Summary ........................................................ 26
2.1 Introduction .............................................. 26
2.2 David Hilbert's view ...................................... 28
2.3 Analysis .................................................. 30
2.4 Semantics ................................................. 33
2.5 Intelligence .............................................. 35
2.6 Nature .................................................... 42
2.7 Values .................................................... 44
Conclusion ..................................................... 45
Chapter 3 The method of levels of abstraction ................. 46
Summary ........................................................ 46
3.1 Introduction .............................................. 47
3.2 Some definitions and preliminary examples ................. 48
3.2.1 Typed variable ..................................... 48
3.2.2 Observable ......................................... 48
3.2.3 Six examples ....................................... 49
3.2.4 Levels of abstraction .............................. 52
3.2.5 Behaviour .......................................... 53
3.2.6 Gradient of abstraction ............................ 54
3.3 A classic interpretation of the method of abstraction ..... 58
3.4 Some philosophical applications ........................... 60
3.4.1 Agents ............................................. 60
3.4.2 The Turing test .................................... 61
3.4.2.1 Turing's imitation game ................... 61
3.4.2.2 Turing's test revisited ................... 62
3.4.2.3 Turing discussed .......................... 63
3.4.3 Emergence .......................................... 63
3.4.4 Artificial life .................................... 65
3.4.5 Quantum observation ................................ 66
3.4.6 Decidable observation .............................. 66
3.4.7 Simulation and functionalism ....................... 67
3.5 The philosophy of the method of abstraction ............... 68
3.5.1 Levels of organization and of explanation .......... 69
3.5.2 Conceptual schemes ................................. 71
3.5.3 Pluralism without relativism ....................... 74
3.5.4 Realism without descriptivism ...................... 75
3.5.6 Constructionism .................................... 76
Conclusion ..................................................... 78
Chapter 4 Semantic information and the veridicality thesis .... 80
Summary ........................................................ 80
4.1 Introduction .............................................. 80
4.2 The data-based approach to semantic information ........... 82
4.3 The general definition of information ..................... 83
4.4 Understanding data ........................................ 85
4.5 Taxonomic neutrality ...................................... 86
4.6 Typological neutrality .................................... 87
4.7 Ontological neutrality .................................... 90
4.8 Genetic neutrality ........................................ 91
4.9 Alethic neutrality ........................................ 92
4.10 Why false information is not a kind of semantic
information ............................................... 93
4.11 Why false information is pseudo-information: Attributive
vs predicative use ........................................ 97
4.12 Why false information is pseudo-information: A semantic
argument .................................................. 98
4.12.1 First step: Too much information ................... 99
4.12.2 Second step: Excluding tautologies ................ 100
4.12.3 Third step: Excluding contradictions .............. 100
4.12.4 Fourth step: Excluding inconsistencies ............ 101
4.12.5 Last step: Only contingently true propositions
count as semantic information ..................... 103
4 13 The definition of semantic information ................... 104
Conclusion .................................................... 106
Chapter 5 Outline of a theory of strongly semantic
information ................................................... 108
Summary ....................................................... 108
5.1 Introduction ............................................. 109
5.2 The Bar-Hillel-Carnap Paradox ............................ 111
5.3 Three criteria of information equivalence ................ 114
5.4 Three desiderata for TSSI ................................ 117
5.5 Degrees of vacuity and inaccuracy ........................ 117
5.6 Degrees of informativeness ............................... 123
5.7 Quantities of vacuity and of semantic information ........ 125
5.8 The solution of the Bar-Hillel-Carnap Paradox ............ 127
5.9 TSSI and the scandal of deduction ........................ 129
Conclusion .................................................... 132
Chapter 6 The symbol grounding problem ....................... 134
Summary ....................................................... 134
6.1 Introduction ............................................. 134
6.2 The symbol grounding problem ............................. 136
6.3 The representationalist approach ......................... 137
6.3.1 A hybrid model for the solution of the SGP ........ 138
6.3.1.1 SGP and the symbolic theft hypothesis ..... 142
6.3.2 A functional model for the solution of the SGP .... 143
6.3.3 An intentional model for the solution of the SGP .. 144
6.3.3.1 Clarion ................................... 146
6.4 The semi-representationalist approach .................... 149
6.4.1 An epistemological model for the solution of the
SGP ............................................... 149
6.4.2 The physical symbol grounding problem ............. 150
6.4.3 A model based on temporal delays and predictive
semantics for the solution of the SGP ............. 153
6.5 The non-representationalist approach ..................... 155
6.5.1 A communication-based model for the solution of
the SGP ........................................... 156
6.5.2 A behaviour-based model for the solution of the
SGP ............................................... 157
6.5.2.1 Emulative learning and the rejection of
representations .......................... 159
Conclusion .................................................... 160
Chapter 7 Action-based semantics ............................. 162
Summary ....................................................... 162
7.1 Introduction ............................................. 162
7.2 Action-based Semantics ................................... 164
7.3 Two-machine artificial agents and their AbS .............. 166
7.3.1 Three controversial aspects of AM2 ................ 172
7.3.2 Learning and performing rule through Hebb's rule
and local selection ............................... 173
7.4 From grounded symbols to grounded communication and
abstractions ............................................. 176
Conclusion .................................................... 179
Chapter 8 Semantic information and the correctness theory
of truth ...................................................... 182
Summary ....................................................... 182
8.1 Introduction ............................................. 183
8.2 First step: Translation .................................. 186
8.3 Second step: Polarization ................................ 188
8.4 Third step: Normalization ................................ 190
8.5 Fourth step: Verification and validation ................. 193
8.6 Fifth step: Correctness .................................. 195
8.7 Some implications and advantages of the correctness
theory of truth .......................................... 199
8.7.1 Truthmakers and coherentism ....................... 199
8.7.2 Accessibility, bidimensionalism, and
correspondentism .................................. 201
8.7.3 Types of semantic information and the variety of
truths ............................................ 203
8.7.4 A deflationist interpretation of falsehood as
failure ........................................... 205
8.7.5 The information-inaptness of semantic paradoxes ... 205
Conclusion .................................................... 208
Chapter 9 The logical unsolvability of the Gettier problem ... 209
Summary ....................................................... 209
9.1 Introduction ............................................. 210
9.2 Why the Gettier problem is unsolvable in principle ....... 212
9.3 Three objections and replies ............................. 217
Conclusion .................................................... 222
Chapter 10 The logic of being informed ........................ 224
Summary ....................................................... 224
10.1 Introduction ............................................. 224
10.2 Three logics of information .............................. 226
10.3 Modelling 'being informed' ............................... 228
10.3.1 IL satisfies A1, A2, A3, A5 ....................... 229
10.3.2 Consistency and truth: IL satisfies A9 and A4 ..... 230
10.3.3 No reflectivity: IL does not satisfy A6, A8 ....... 232
10.3.4 Transmissibility: IL satisfies Аю and А11 ......... 236
10.3.5 Constructing the Information Base: IL satisfies
A7 ................................................ 236
10.3.6 KTB-IL ............................................ 237
10.4 Four epistemological implications of KTB-IL .............. 238
10.4.1 Information overload in KTB-IL .................... 238
10.4.2 In favour of the veridicality thesis .............. 239
10.4.3 The relations between DL, IL and EL ............... 240
10.4.4 Against the untouchable ........................... 241
Conclusion .................................................... 243
Chapter 11 Understanding epistemic relevance .................. 244
Summary ....................................................... 244
11.1 Introduction ............................................. 245
11.2 Epistemic vs causal relevance ............................ 246
11.3 The basic case ........................................... 249
11.3.1 Advantages of the basic case ...................... 249
11.3.2 Limits of the basic case .......................... 251
11.4 A probabilistic revision of the basic case ............... 251
11.4.1 Advantages of the probabilistic revision .......... 252
11.4.2 Limits of the probabilistic revision .............. 252
11.5 A counterfactual revision of the probabilistic analysis .. 253
11.5.1 Advantages of the counterfactual revision ......... 253
11.5.2 Limits of the counterfactual revision ............. 253
11.6 A metatheoretical revision of the counterfactual
analysis ................................................. 254
11.7 Advantages of the metatheoretical revision ............... 256
11.8 Some illustrative cases .................................. 257
11.9 Misinformation cannot be relevant ........................ 260
11.10 Two objections and replies .............................. 261
11.10.1 Completeness: No relevant semantic information
for semanticaliy unable agents .................. 261
11.10.2 Soundness: Rationality does not presuppose
relevance ....................................... 262
Conclusion .................................................... 265
Chapter 12 Semantic information and the network theory of
account ....................................................... 267
Summary ....................................................... 267
12.1 Introduction ............................................. 268
12.2 The nature of the upgrading problem: Mutual
independence ............................................. 268
12.3 Solving the upgrading problem: The network theory of
account .................................................. 274
12.4 Advantages of a network theory of account ................ 279
12.5 Testing the network theory of account .................... 284
Conclusion .................................................... 288
Chapter 13 Consciousness, agents, and the knowledge game ...... 290
Summary ....................................................... 290
13.1 Introduction ............................................. 290
13.2 The knowledge game ....................................... 296
13.3 The first and classic version of the knowledge game:
Externally inferable states .............................. 297
13.3.1 Synchronic inferences: A fairer version of the
knowledge game .................................... 298
13.3.2 Winners of the classic version .................... 300
13.4 The second version of the knowledge game ................. 301
13.5 The third version of the knowledge game .................. 302
13.6 The fourth version of the knowledge game ................. 307
13.7 Dretske's question and the knowledge game ................ 309
Conclusion .................................................... 313
Chapter 14 Against digital ontology ........................... 316
Summary ....................................................... 316
14.1 Introduction ............................................. 316
14.2 What is digital ontology? It from Bit .................... 317
14.2.1 Digital ontology: From physical to metaphysical
problems .......................................... 320
14.3 The thought experiment ................................... 325
14.3.1 Stage 1: Reality in itself is digital or
analogue .......................................... 327
14.3.2 Stage 2: The stubborn legacy of the analogue ...... 329
14.3.3 Stage 3: The observer's analysis .................. 330
14.3.4 Digital and analogue are features of the level
of abstraction .................................... 332
14.4 Three objections and replies ............................. 334
Conclusion .................................................... 337
Chapter 15 A defence of informational structural realism ...... 339
Summary ....................................................... 339
15.1 Introduction ............................................. 340
15.2 First step: ESR and OSR are not incompatible ............. 344
15.2.1 Indirect knowledge ................................ 345
15.2.2 Structuralism and the levels of abstraction ....... 347
15.2.3 Ontological commitments and levels of
abstractions ...................................... 348
15.2.4 How to reconcile ESR and OSR ...................... 349
15.3 Second step: Relata are not logically prior to all
relations ................................................ 353
15.4 Third step: The concept of a structural object is not
empty .................................................... 355
15.5 Informational structural realism ......................... 360
15.6 Ten objections and replies ............................... 361
Conclusion .................................................... 369
References .................................................... 372
Index ......................................................... 401
|
