Mind and cognition: an anthology. - 3rd ed. / ed. by Lycan W.G., Prinz J.J. - 3rd ed. - Oxford: Blackwell, 2008. - xvi, 877 p.: ill. - (Blackwell philosophy anthologies; 8). - Auth. ind.: p.863-870. - Sub. ind.: p.871-877. - ISBN 978-1405-15785-8  Место хранения:   035 | Объединенный институт истории, филологии и философии СО РАН | Новосибирск | Библиотека

Оглавление / Contents

Preface to the Third Edition ................................... xi Preface to the First Edition .................................. xii Acknowledgments .............................................. xiii Part I. Ontology: The Identity Theory and Functionalism ...... 1 Introduction .................................................... 3 Behaviorism .................................................... 15 1. Excerpt from About Behaviorism B.F. Skinner ....................................... 17 The Identity Theory and Machine Functionalism .................. 23 2. Is Consciousness a Brain Process? U.T. Place .......................................... 25 3. The Causal Theory of the Mind D.M. Armstrong ......................................... 31 4. The Nature of Mental States Hilary Putnam ....................................... 40 5. Troubles with Functionalism (excerpt) Ned Block ........................................... 48 Anomalous Monism ............................................... 53 6. Mental Events Donald Davidson ..................................... 55 Homuncular and Teleological Functionalism ...................... 67 7. The Continuity of Levels of Nature William G. Lycan .................................... 69 Part II. Intentionality ...................................... 85 Introduction ................................................... 87 Psychosemantics ................................................ 93 8. Information and Representation Jerry A. Fodor ...................................... 95 9. Biosemantics Ruth Garrett Millikan .............................. 105 10. A Guide to Naturalizing Semantics (excerpt) Barry Loewer ....................................... 116 Other Approaches to Intentionality ............................ 125 11. Modality, Normativity, and Intentionality Robert Brandom ..................................... 127 Part III. The Computational Theory of Mind and Artificial Intelligence ....................................... 143 Introduction .................................................. 145 The Language of Thought and Computationalism .................. 151 12. Why There Has to Be and How There Could Be a Private Language Jerry A. Fodor ..................................... 153 13. Which Language Do We Think With? Peter Carruthers ................................... 171 Artificial Intelligence ....................................... 193 14. Semantic Engines: An Introduction to Mind Design John Haugeland ..................................... 195 15. Can Computers Think? John R. Searle ..................................... 213 Part IV. Eliminativism, Neurophilosophy, and Anti-Representationalism ........................... 221 Introduction .................................................. 223 Eliminativism ................................................. 229 16. Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes Paul M. Churchland ................................. 231 Connectionism ................................................. 245 17. Neural Representation and Neural Computation Patricia Smith Churchland and Terrence Sejnowski ... 247 18. Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture (excerpt) Jerry A. Fodor and Zenon W. Pylyshyn ............... 269 Dynamical Systems Theory and Robotics ......................... 273 19. What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation? Tim Van Gelder ..................................... 275 20. Intelligence Without Representation Rodney A. Brooks ................................... 298 Part V. Instrumentalism and Folk Psychology ................. 313 Introduction .................................................. 315 Instrumentalism ............................................... 321 21. True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works Daniel C. Dennett .................................. 323 22. Dennett on Intentional Systems Stephen P. Stich ................................... 337 23. Real Patterns Daniel C. Dennett .................................. 351 Simulationism and the Theory Theory ........................... 367 24. Folk Psychology as Simulation Robert M. Gordon ................................... 369 25. Folk Psychology: Simulation or Tacit Theory? (excerpt) Stephen P. Stich and Shaun Nichols ................. 379 Part VI. Mental Causation, Externalism, and Self-Knowledge ..................................... 393 Introduction .................................................. 395 For and Against Folk Psychology ............................... 403 26. Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis Stephen P. Stich ................................... 405 27. Folk Psychology is Here to Stay Terence Horgan and James Woodward .................. 419 Supervenient Causation ........................................ 437 28. Mental Causation Jaegwon Kim ........................................ 439 29. Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical Brian P. McLaughlin ................................ 459 For and Against Externalism ................................... 475 30. Individualism and Supervenience Jerry A. Fodor ..................................... 477 31. The Argument from Causal Powers Robert A. Wilson ................................... 497 32. Reference, Causal Powers, Externalist Intuitions and Unicorns Gabriel M.A. Segal ................................. 515 Self-Knowledge ................................................ 527 33. Knowing One's Own Mind Donald Davidson .................................... 529 34. Externalism and Inference Paul A. Boghossian ................................. 543 Radical Externalism ........................................... 553 35. The Extended Mind Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers ................... 555 Part VII. Consciousness, Qualia, and Subjectivity ............ 565 Introduction .................................................. 567 What Is Consciousness? ........................................ 573 36. How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness Ned Block ........................................... 575 37. What Should We Expect from a Theory of Consciousness? Patricia S. Churchland ............................. 583 38. Consciousness and its Place in Nature (excerpt) David J. Chalmers .................................. 595 Conscious Awareness ........................................... 603 39. A Theory of Consciousness (excerpt) David M. Rosenthal ................................. 605 40. The Superiority of HOP to HOT William G. Lycan ................................... 617 41. Perception without Awareness Fred Dretske ....................................... 630 What It's Like ................................................ 655 42. Epiphenomenal Qualia Frank Jackson ...................................... 657 43. Understanding the Phenomenal Mind: Are We All Just Armadillos? Robert Van Gulick ................................... 664 Qualia ........................................................ 679 44. The Intrinsic Quality of Experience Gilbert Harman ..................................... 681 45. Sensation and the Content of Experience Christopher Peacocke ............................... 693 46. Blurry Images, Double Vision, and Other Oddities: New Problems for Representationalism? Michael Tye ........................................ 707 Part VIII. Perceptual Content ................................. 725 Introduction .................................................. 727 47. Simple Seeing Fred Dretske ....................................... 731 48. Excerpts from The Varieties of Reference Gareth Evans ....................................... 741 49. Non-conceptual Content John McDowell ...................................... 748 50. Experience Without the Head Alva Noë ........................................... 760 Part IX. Animal Minds ....................................... 777 Introduction .................................................. 779 51. Rational Animals Donald Davidson .................................... 781 52. The Problem of Simple Minds: Is There Anything it is Like to be a Honey Bee? Michael Tye ........................................ 788 53. Why the Question of Animal Consciousness Might Not Matter Very Much Peter Carruthers ................................... 805 Part X. Emotion ............................................ 821 Introduction .................................................. 823 54. Emotions and Choice Robert C. Solomon .................................. 827 55. Embodied Emotions Jesse Prinz ........................................ 839 56. Is Emotion a Natural Kind? Paul E. Griffiths .................................. 850 Author Index .................................................. 863 Subject Index ................................................. 871