Acknowledgments ................................................ ix
Introduction .................................................... 1
PART ONE: A Century of Work in the Philosophy of Language
CHAPTER ONE. The Logical Study of Language ...................... 7
1.1 Gottlob Frege - Origins of the Modern Enterprise ........... 7
1.1.1 Foundations of Philosophical Semantics .............. 7
1.1.2 Frege's Distinction between Sense and Reference ..... 8
1.1.3 The Compositionality of Sense and Reference ........ 10
1.1.4 Frege's Hierarchy of Indirect Senses and
Referents .......................................... 13
1.1.5 The Semantic Importance of Frege's Platonist
Epistemology ....................................... 15
1.1.6 Potential Problems and Alternative Analyses ........ 16
1.1.7 The Fregean Legacy ................................. 20
1.2 Bertrand Russell: Fundamental Themes ...................... 20
1.2.1 Quantification, Propositions, and Propositional
Functions .......................................... 20
1.2.2 Generalized Quantifiers ............................ 23
1.2.3 Denoting Phrases, Definite Descriptions, and
Logical Form ....................................... 24
1.2.4 Russell's Theory of Scope .......................... 26
1.2.5 Thought, Meaning, Acquaintance, and Logically
Proper Names ....................................... 28
1.2.6 Existence and Negative Existentials ................ 30
Selected Further Reading .................................. 32
CHAPTER TWO. Truth, Interpretation, and Meaning ................ 33
2.1 The Importance of Tarski ................................... 33
2.1.1 Truth, Models, and Logical Consequence ............. 33
2.1.2 The Significance of Tarski for the Philosophy
of Language ........................................ 38
2.2 Rudolf Carnap's Embrace of Truth-Theoretic Semantics ...... 41
2.3 The Semantic Approach of Donald Davidson .................. 45
Selected Further Reading .................................. 49
CHAPTER THREE. Meaning, Modality, and Possible Worlds
Semantics ...................................................... 50
3.1 Kripke-Style Possible Worlds Semantics .................... 50
3.2 Robert Stalnaker and David Lewis on Counterfactuals ....... 56
3.3 The Montagovian Vision .................................... 63
Selected Further Reading .................................. 75
CHAPTER FOUR. Rigid Designation, Direct Reference, and
Indexicality ................................................... 77
4.1 Background ................................................ 77
4.2 Kripke on Names, Natural Kind Terms, and Necessity ........ 78
4.2.1 Rigid Designation, Essentialism, and
Nonlinguistic Necessity ............................ 78
4.2.2 The Nondescriptive Semantics of Names .............. 80
4.2.3 Natural Kind Terms ................................. 88
4.2.4 Kripke's Essentialist Route to the Necessary
Aposteriori ........................................ 91
4.3 Kaplan on Direct Reference and Indexicality ............... 93
4.3.1 Significance: The Tension between Logic and
Semantics .......................................... 93
4.3.2 The Basic Structure of the Logic of
Demonstratives ..................................... 94
4.3.3 Direct Reference and Rigid Designation ............. 97
4.3.4 'Dthat' and Actually' .............................. 99
4.3.5 English Demonstratives vs. 'Dthat' -Rigidihed
Descriptions ...................................... 100
4.3.6 Final Assessment .................................. 104
Selected Further Reading ................................. 105
PART TWO: New Directions CHAPTER FIVE
The Metaphysics of Meaning: Propositions and Possible Worlds .. 109
5.1 Loci of Controversy ...................................... 109
5.2 Propositions ............................................. 111
5.2.1 Why We Need Them and Why Theories of Truth
Conditions Can't Provide Them ..................... 111
5.2.2 Why Traditional Propositions Won't Do ............. 113
5.2.3 Toward a Naturalistic Theory of Propositions ...... 116
5.2.3.1 The Deflationary Approach ................ 117
5.2.3.2 The Cognitive-Realist Approach ........... 121
5.3 Possible World-States ............................... 123
5.3.1 How to Understand Possible World-States .... 123
5.3.2 The Relationship between Modal and
Nonmodal Truths ............................ 126
5.3.3 Our Knowledge of World-States .............. 126
5.3.4 Existent and Nonexistent World-States ...... 128
5.3.5 The Function of World-States in Our
Theories ................................... 129
Selected Further Reading ................................. 130
CHAPTER SIX. Apriority, Aposteriority, and Actuality .......... 131
6.1 Language, Philosophy, and the Modalities ................. 131
6.2 Apriority and Actuality .................................. 132
6.2.1 Apriori Knowledge of the Truth of Aposteriori
Propositions at the Actual World-State ............ 132
6.2.2 The Contingent Apriori and the Apriori
Equivalence of P and the Proposition That P Is
True at @ ......................................... 134
6.2.3 Why Apriority Isn't Closed under Apriori
Consequence: Two Ways of Knowing @ ................ 135
6.2.4 Apriori Truths That Are Known Only Aposteriori .... 136
6.2.5 Apriority and Epistemic Possibility ............... 137
6.2.6 Are Singular Thoughts Instances of the Contingent
Apriori? .......................................... 140
6.3 'Actually' ............................................... 142
Selected Further Reading ................................. 143
CHAPTER SEVEN. The Limits of Meaning .......................... 145
7.1 The Traditional Conception of Meaning, Thought,
Assertion, and Implicature ............................... 145
7.2 Challenges to the Traditional Conception ................. 147
7.2.1 Demonstratives: A Revision of Kaplan .............. 147
7.2.2 Incomplete Descriptions, Quantifiers,
and Context ....................................... 151
7.2.3 Pragmatic Enrichment and Incomplete Semantic
Contents .......................................... 155
7.2.3.1 Implicature, Impliciture, and Assertion ....... 155
7.2.3.2 Pervasive Incompleteness? Possessives,
Compound Nominals, and Temporal Modification .. 158
7.3 A New Conception of the Relationship between Meaning,
Thought, Assertion, and Implicature ...................... 163
7.3.1 The Guiding Principle ............................. 163
7.3.2 Demonstratives and Incomplete Descriptions
Revisited ......................................... 164
7.3.3 Names and Propositional Attitudes ................. 168
7.4 What Is Meaning? The Distinction between Semantics and
Pragmatics ............................................... 171
Selected Further Reading ................................. 173
References ............................................... 175
Index ......................................................... 187
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